An optimal slow Dutch auction

Artyom Shneyerov ()

Economic Theory, 2014, vol. 57, issue 3, 577-602

Abstract: We study slow Dutch auctions, where the clock does not fall instantaneously, but instead falls over time. Buyers are assumed less patient than the seller. In a symmetric setting, we investigate the properties of the optimal revenue-maximizing clock. We find that the clock is genuinely dynamic and the auction involves delays. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Dynamic auctions; Optimal control; D44; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-014-0825-z (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:57:y:2014:i:3:p:577-602

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-014-0825-z

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().