Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria
Scott Macdonell () and
Nick Mastronardi ()
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Scott Macdonell: http://www.scott-macdonell.com
Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 58, issue 1, 183-216
Abstract:
We analyze the strategic allocation of resources across two contests as in the canonical Colonel Blotto game. In the games we study, two players simultaneously allocate their forces across two fields of battle. The larger force on each battlefield wins that battle, and the payoff to a player is the sum of the values of battlefields won. We completely characterize the set of Nash equilibria of all two-battlefield Blotto games and provide the unique equilibrium payoffs. We also show how to extend our characterization to cover previously unstudied games with nonlinear resource constraints. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Keywords: Colonel Blotto game; Zero-sum game; Warfare; All-pay auction; Multi-unit auction; C72; H56; D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:58:y:2015:i:1:p:183-216
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-014-0807-1
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