Robust stochastic stability

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Nick Netzer

Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 58, issue 1, 57 pages

Abstract: A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius–coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Learning in games; Stochastic stability; Radius–coradius theorems; Logit-response dynamics; Mutations; Imitation; C72; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-014-0809-z

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