Further results on essential Nash equilibria in normal-form games

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 59, issue 2, 277-300

Abstract: A Nash equilibrium $$x$$ x of a normal-form game $$G$$ G is essential if any perturbation of $$G$$ G has an equilibrium close to $$x$$ x . Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of games containing a dense, residual subset of games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection covers economic examples that cannot be handled by extant results and subsumes the sets of games considered in the literature. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Infinite normal-form game; Equilibrium refinement; Essential equilibrium; Equilibrium existence; Continuous security; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-014-0829-8

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