Dynamic network formation with incomplete information

Yangbo Song () and Mihaela Schaar ()

Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 59, issue 2, 331 pages

Abstract: How do networks form and what is their ultimate topology? Most of the literature that addresses these questions assumes complete information: agents know in advance the value of linking even with agents they have never met and with whom they have had no previous interaction (direct or indirect). This paper addresses the same questions under the much more natural assumption of incomplete information: agents do not know in advance—but must learn—the value of linking. We show that incomplete information has profound implications for the formation process and the ultimate topology. Under complete information, the network topologies that form and are stable typically consist of agents of relatively high value only. Under incomplete information, a much wider collection of network topologies can emerge and be stable. Moreover, even with the same topology, the locations of agents can be very different: An agent can achieve a central position purely as the result of chance rather than as the result of merit. All of this can occur even in settings where agents eventually learn everything so that information, although initially incomplete, eventually becomes complete. The ultimate network topology depends significantly on the formation history, which is natural and true in practice, and incomplete information makes this phenomenon more prevalent. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Network formation; Incomplete information; Dynamic network formation; Link formation; Formation history; Externalities; A14; C72; D62; D83; D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0858-y

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