# Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests

Christian Ewerhart ()

Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 60, issue 1, 59-71

Abstract: Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter (“ $$2>R>\infty$$ 2 > R > ∞ ”) has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a cost of being “halfhearted,” which is absent from both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively skewed and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-post overdissipation than the all-pay auction. Copyright The Author(s) 2015

Keywords: Tullock contest; Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; Analytical functions; C72; D72; C16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31) Track citations by RSS feed

http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-014-0835-x (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2