Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests
Christian Ewerhart ()
Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 60, issue 1, 59-71
Any symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a Tullock contest with intermediate values of the decisiveness parameter (“ $$2>R>\infty $$ 2 > R > ∞ ”) has countably infinitely many mass points. All probability weight is concentrated on those mass points, which have the zero bid as their sole point of accumulation. With contestants randomizing over a non-convex set, there is a cost of being “halfhearted,” which is absent from both the lottery contest and the all-pay auction. Numerical bid distributions are generally negatively skewed and exhibit, for some parameter values, a higher probability of ex-post overdissipation than the all-pay auction. Copyright The Author(s) 2015
Keywords: Tullock contest; Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; Analytical functions; C72; D72; C16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Mixed equilibria in Tullock contests (2014)
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