Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships

Ayça Kaya and Galina Vereshchagina

Economic Theory, 2015, vol. 60, issue 1, 73-121

Abstract: We examine how equilibrium sorting patterns in a matching market for partnerships are impacted by the presence of bilateral moral hazard in a repeated production setting. We find that this impact depends on how the cost of moral hazard manifests itself—whether efficient effort is not feasible or desirable from the beginning, or whether inefficient effort is resorted to only as a punishment equilibrium. Which of these is the case depends on both the details of the technology and the contractual environment. In the former case, the presence of moral hazard moves the market away from positive sorting. In the latter case, whether moral hazard favors positive or negative sorting depends on how the power of incentives needed to implement effort varies with the observable types of the agents. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Moral hazard; Partnerships; Assortative matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:60:y:2015:i:1:p:73-121

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0895-6

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