Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 63, issue 2, No 3, 407-430

Abstract: Abstract What is the minimal structure that is needed to perform equilibrium analysis in large extensive form games? To answer this question, this paper provides conditions that are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in any well-behaved perfect information game defined on a large game tree. In particular, the set of plays needs to be endowed with a topology satisfying two conditions. (a) Nodes are closed as sets of plays; and (b) the immediate predecessor function is an open map.

Keywords: Backwards induction; Subgame perfection; Equilibrium existence; Large extensive form games; Perfect information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0937-0

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