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Overlapping multiple object assignments

Jörgen Kratz ()

Economic Theory, 2017, vol. 63, issue 3, 723-753

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple object assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers. Agents have complete, transitive and strict preferences over bundles of objects. A rule assigns objects to agents. A single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the agents satisfy a compatibility constraint. If no restrictions are imposed on the compatibility structure, there exists no rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and compatibility-monotonicity. Imposing two restrictions on the compatibility structure, the class of rules called compatibility-sorting sequential dictatorships can be fully characterized by four different combinations of group-strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, compatibility-monotonicity and compatibility-invariance. It is demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (J Public Econ Theory 3:258–271, 2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained as a special case of the main result. Finally, some additional properties are considered and an extension of the model introducing capacity constraints is presented.

Keywords: Overlapping assignments; Sharable goods; Sequential dictatorship; Compatibility; D61; D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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