Education, social mobility, and the mismatch of talents
Yuki Uchida ()
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Yuki Uchida: Osaka University
Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 65, issue 3, 575-607
Abstract This study presents a two-class, overlapping-generation model featuring social mobility inhibited by the mismatch of talents. Mobility decreases as the private education gap between the two classes widens, whereas it increases with increased public education spending. Within this framework, the study considers voting on public education and shows that when the political power of the rich is strong, the government implements low redistributive expenditures, which in turn induces a cyclical motion of social mobility across generations.
Keywords: Social mobility; Public education; Redistribution; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 I24 J62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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