Voting in the limelight

Ronen Gradwohl ()
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Ronen Gradwohl: Northwestern University

Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 66, issue 1, No 3, 65-103

Abstract: Abstract When committees make decisions, voting rules are coupled with one of three disclosure rules: open voting, in which each committee member’s individual vote is revealed; anonymous voting, in which only an anonymized tally is publicized; and secret voting, in which only the outcome is disclosed. I focus on strategic voters who have a preference for strategic ambiguity, and show that the amount of disclosure may have a non-monotonic effect on both the accuracy of the decision and the welfare of the voters. In particular, anonymous voting can yield both lower accuracy and higher welfare than both open and secret voting.

Keywords: Committees; Voting; Transparency; Privacy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1054-z

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