A limit result on bargaining sets

Javier Hervés-Estévez () and Emma Moreno-García
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Javier Hervés-Estévez: Universidad de Vigo, RGEA

Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 66, issue 2, No 3, 327-341

Abstract: Abstract We introduce a notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show its convergence to the set of Walrasian allocations.

Keywords: Bargaining set; Coalitions; Core; Veto mechanism; Justified objections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D11 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1063-y

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