An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies
Leonidas C. Koutsougeras and
Claudia Meo ()
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Leonidas C. Koutsougeras: University of Manchester
Claudia Meo: Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”
Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 66, issue 2, 301-325
Abstract We consider strategic market games associated to exchange economies both in a framework with no uncertainty and with asymmetric information. We address the asymptotic convergence of active Nash equilibria of strategic market games to Walrasian ones for general sequences of economies whose distribution of characteristics has compact support.
Keywords: Strategic market games; Price taking; Convergence; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D50 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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