An asymptotic analysis of strategic behavior for exchange economies

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras and Claudia Meo ()
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Leonidas C. Koutsougeras: University of Manchester
Claudia Meo: Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”

Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 66, issue 2, No 2, 325 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider strategic market games associated to exchange economies both in a framework with no uncertainty and with asymmetric information. We address the asymptotic convergence of active Nash equilibria of strategic market games to Walrasian ones for general sequences of economies whose distribution of characteristics has compact support.

Keywords: Strategic market games; Price taking; Convergence; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1068-6

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