A qualitative theory of large games with strategic complementarities

Łukasz Balbus, Pawel Dziewulski, Kevin Reffett and Łukasz Woźny
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Kevin Reffett: Arizona State University

Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 67, issue 3, No 2, 497-523

Abstract: Abstract We study the existence and computation of equilibrium in large games with strategic complementarities. Using monotone operators defined on the space of distributions partially ordered with respect to the first-order stochastic dominance, we prove existence of a greatest and least distributional Nash equilibrium. In particular, we obtain our results under a different set of conditions than those in the existing literature. Moreover, we provide computable monotone distributional equilibrium comparative statics with respect to the parameters of the game. Finally, we apply our results to models of social distance, large stopping games, keeping up with the Joneses, as well as a general class of linear non-atomic games.

Keywords: Large games; Distributional equilibria; Supermodular games; Games with strategic complementarities; Computation of equilibria; Non-aggregative games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1075-7

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