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Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size

Yan Long ()
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Yan Long: New York University Abu Dhabi

Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 68, issue 3, No 3, 579-608

Abstract: Abstract One group has to be selected among a set of agents. Agents have preferences over the size of the group if they are selected, and preferences over size as well as the “stand-outside” option are single-peaked. Two classes of efficient, individually rational and strategy-proof rules, are presented. The proposingrules allow agents to either maintain or shrink the group size following a fixed priority and are characterized by group strategy-proofness. The voting rules enlarge the group size in each voting round and achieve at least half of the maximal group size compatible with individual rationality.

Keywords: Group selection; Group size; Single-peaked preference; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1135-7

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