Nash and Bayes–Nash equilibria in strategic-form games with intransitivities

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean

Economic Theory, 2019, vol. 68, issue 4, No 7, 935-965

Abstract: Abstract We study games with intransitive preferences that admit skew-symmetric representations. We introduce the notion of surrogate better-reply security for discontinuous skew-symmetric games and elucidate the relationship between surrogate better-reply security and other security concepts in the literature. We then prove existence of behavioral strategy equilibrium for discontinuous skew-symmetric games of incomplete information (and, in particular, existence of mixed-strategy equilibrium for discontinuous skew-symmetric games of complete information), generalizing extant results.

Keywords: Skew-symmetric game; Bayesian game; Existence of Nash equilibrium; Discontinuous game; Behavioral strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1151-7

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