 Weak implementationEconomic Theory, 2020, vol. 69, issue 3, No 2, 569-594 Abstract: Abstract I define Weak Implementation under incomplete information. A social choice set is weakly implementable if the set of equilibrium outcomes of some mechanism is a non-empty subset of the social choice set. Weak implementation is a more natural objective than either full or partial implementation in many cases. I show that there are social choice sets where every subset can be weakly implemented, yet the set cannot be fully implemented. I give a complete characterization of the weakly implementable social choice sets under a weak restriction on preferences. As a corollary, I show that in independent private values environments the set of interim efficient social choice functions is weakly implementable whenever it is partially implementable. Keywords: Implementation theory; Mechanism design; Game theory; Full implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:69:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01178-8 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01178-8 Access Statistics for this article Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC. |
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