A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
Christoph Kuzmics and
Daniel Rodenburger ()
Additional contact information
Daniel Rodenburger: University of Jena
Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 70, issue 3, No 4, 685-721
Abstract We reinvestigate data from the voting experiment of Forsythe et al. (Soc Choice Welf 10:223–247, 1993). In every one of 24 rounds, 28 players were randomly (re)allocated into two groups of 14 to play a voting stage game with or without a preceding opinion poll phase. We find that the null hypothesis that play in every round is given by a particular evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium of the 14-player stage game cannot be rejected if we account for risk aversion (or a heightened concern for coordination), calibrated in another treatment.
Keywords: Opinion polls; Elections; Testing; Nash equilibrium; Attainable equilibrium; Evolutionary stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-019-01224-5 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:70:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-019-01224-5
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils
More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().