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A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory

Christoph Kuzmics and Daniel Rodenburger ()
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Daniel Rodenburger: University of Jena

Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 70, issue 3, No 4, 685-721

Abstract: Abstract We reinvestigate data from the voting experiment of Forsythe et al. (Soc Choice Welf 10:223–247, 1993). In every one of 24 rounds, 28 players were randomly (re)allocated into two groups of 14 to play a voting stage game with or without a preceding opinion poll phase. We find that the null hypothesis that play in every round is given by a particular evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium of the 14-player stage game cannot be rejected if we account for risk aversion (or a heightened concern for coordination), calibrated in another treatment.

Keywords: Opinion polls; Elections; Testing; Nash equilibrium; Attainable equilibrium; Evolutionary stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01224-5

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