On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems

Jun Zhang ()
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Jun Zhang: Nanjing Audit University

Economic Theory, 2023, vol. 76, issue 1, No 8, 289-310

Abstract: Abstract Non-wastefulness is a commonly used efficiency criterion for random assignments in discrete allocation problems when agents may regard some objects as unacceptable. We study the source of wastefulness in randomization. We distinguish between the type of wastefulness that exists only from an ex-ante view and the type of wastefulness that can be ex-post realized, and provide characterizations. We prove three theorems showing that strategy-proof and fair mechanisms must find wasteful random assignments for some problems and their wastefulness can be ex-post realized.

Keywords: Random assignment; Wastefulness; Strategy-proofness; Fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01459-9

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