Information aggregation in large collective purchases

Itai Arieli (), Moran Koren () and Rann Smorodinsky ()
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Itai Arieli: Technion
Moran Koren: Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Rann Smorodinsky: Technion

Economic Theory, 2024, vol. 78, issue 1, No 10, 295-345

Abstract: Abstract Society uses the following mechanism to decide on the supply of an experience good. Each agent can choose whether or not to contribute to the good. Contributions are collected, and the good is supplied whenever total contributions exceed a threshold. We study the case where the good is excludable, agents have a common value, and each agent receives a private signal about the common value. We study how such collective decisions perform in terms of information aggregation, social efficiency, and market traction.

Keywords: Information aggregation; Crowdfunding; Public good; Voting; Threshold (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D72 D80 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01525-w

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