Auctions with resale at a later date

Sanyyam Khurana ()
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Sanyyam Khurana: TERI School of Advanced Studies

Economic Theory, 2024, vol. 78, issue 3, No 6, 843-875

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we consider fixed time delays in auctions with resale. The time delay may impact the bidders’ valuations of the object. In particular, the auction’s winner may obtain some value by depleting the object, either by consuming it or exploiting it, over the interim period and the loser may lose some value by virtue of the object being depleted by the winner. Our main result is that fixed time delays lead to asymmetric bid distributions. For a special family of probability distributions, we show that the first-price auction is revenue superior to the second-price auction.

Keywords: Resale; Later date; Time delay; Asymmetry (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01577-6

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