Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences (*)

Hans Peters, Gert-Jan Otten and Oscar Volij ()
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Gert-Jan Otten: Department of Econometrics, CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, THE NETHERLANDS

Economic Theory, 1996, vol. 7, issue 2, 306 pages

Abstract: The uniform rule is considered to be the most important rule for the problem of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good between agents who have single-peaked preferences. The uniform rule was studied extensively in the literature and several characterizations were provided. The aim of this paper is to provide two different formulations and corresponding axiomatizations of the uniform rule. These formulations resemble the Nash and the lexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions; the corresponding axiomatizations are based on axioms of independence of irrelevant alternatives and restricted monotonicity.

Date: 1996
Note: Received: June 20, 1994
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Related works:
Working Paper: Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences (1996)
Working Paper: Two Characterizations of the Uniform Rule for Division Problems with Single-Peaked Preferences (1994)
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