Welfare analysis of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information (*)

Oved Yosha and Roberto Serrano
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Oved Yosha: The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel-Aviv University, 69978 Tel-Aviv, ISRAEL and Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA

Economic Theory, 1996, vol. 8, issue 1, 167-175

Abstract: We study the welfare properties of a market with pairwise meetings and asymmetric information, establishing an equivalence between asymptotically expost individually rational and asymptotically (ex-ante, interim and ex-post) efficient equilibrium sequences.

Date: 1996
Note: Received: June 1, 1994; revised version December 1, 1994
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Journal Article: Welfare Analysis of a Market with Pairwise Meetings and Asymmetric Information (1996)
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