Information structures and decentralizability of equilibria (*)

Jeffrey Kline

Economic Theory, 1996, vol. 9, issue 1, 96 pages

Abstract: Decentralizability with respect to an equilibrium concept means that those equilibria for an extensive game and its agent normal form game coincide for any given payoffs. We consider decentralizability of Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and perfect equilibrium. For each equilibrium concept we give a necessary and sufficient condition on the information structure of an extensive game for decentralizability to hold. When it holds it does not matter if agents with the same objectives decide independently or have someone coordinate their actions.

Date: 1996
Note: Received: May 30, 1995; revised version September 5, 1995
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