The law of supply in games, markets and matching models (*)

Greg Engl and Suzanne Scotchmer
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Greg Engl: Allstate Insurance Company, 51 W. Higgins Road, S. Barrington, IL 60010, USA

Economic Theory, 1997, vol. 9, issue 3, 539-550

Abstract: In large games with transferable utility, core payoffs satisfy a comparative statics property: If the proportion of one type of player increases, then the core payoff to that type of player decreases (does not increase). Markets with transferable utility satisfy a similar property: if the aggregate supply of a commodity increases, its value relative to the value of all commodities decreases. In market games, if one type of agent becomes more plentiful, his competitive payoff falls, and its decrease is engineered by a decrease in the relative value of his endowment.

Date: 1997
Note: Received: November 2, 1994; revised version November 18, 1995
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