Multimarket contact and inter-firm cooperation in R&D

Nicholas S. Vonortas ()
Additional contact information
Nicholas S. Vonortas: Center for International Science and Technology Policy and Department of Economics, The George Washington University, 2013 G Street, N.W., Suite 201, Washington, DC 20052, USA

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2000, vol. 10, issue 1, 243-271

Abstract: Research joint ventures (RJVs) have been widely acclaimed for their alleged ability to restore private incentives to undertake R&D. Economists have, however, also sounded the alarm concerning the opportunities RJVs may create for collusion between partners. The danger of anti-competitive behavior increases significantly when repeated R&D collaboration occurs between firms that also "meet" in many product markets. This phenomenon is shown to be present in a large set of U.S.-based RJVs. The question is about the incentive trade-off: Are the alleged advantages of RJVs in terms of enhancing incentives for R&D sufficient to overcome the potential disadvantages in terms of decreasing incentives for R&D due to simultaneous multiproject and multimarket contact? Significant foreign participation, high technological and market uncertainties, and the set up of "porous" RJVs may operate as a check to anti-competitive behavior.

Keywords: Research; joint; ventures; -; Cooperation; in; research; and; development; -; Multimarket; contact; -; Multiproject; contact (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L2 L4 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-01-04
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00191/papers/0010001/00100243.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joevec:v:10:y:2000:i:1:p:243-271

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/191/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Evolutionary Economics is currently edited by Uwe Cantner, Elias Dinopoulos, Horst Hanusch and Luigi Orsenigo

More articles in Journal of Evolutionary Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().