Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly

Michael Wohlgemuth ()
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Michael Wohlgemuth: Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2000, vol. 10, issue 3, 273-295

Abstract: An analytical framework for dealing with political entrepreneurship and reform is proposed which is based on some new combinations of Schumpeterian political economy, an extended version of Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly and some basic elements of New Institutional Economics. It is shown that problems of insufficient award criteria and incomplete contracts which may arise in economic bidding schemes, also - and even more so - characterise political competition. At the same time, these conditions create leeway for Schumpeterian political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and political contestability which will be discussed with special emphasis on incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the sense of risking long-term investments in basic political reforms.

Keywords: Schumpeter; and; public; choice; -; Political; entrepreneurs; -; Entry; barriers; -; Policy; reform; -; Political; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-01-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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