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A note on control costs and logit rules for strategic games

Philippe Solal, Hans Haller (), Richard Baron and Jacques Durieu
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Hans Haller: Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State, University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316, USA
Jacques Durieu: CREUSET, University of Saint-Etienne, 42100 Saint-Etienne, France

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2002, vol. 12, issue 5, 563-575

Abstract: We consider best response dynamics with endogenous noise based on a finite game in strategic form. A player can reduce the noise level by expending an extra effort and incurring some disutility or control costs. We specify control costs that result in logit adjustment rules. The stochastically stable states of the dynamic process are partial Nash configurations, that is, states where at least one player plays a best response against the others. If the game has a potential, then the stochastically stable states coincide with the Nash equilibria on which the potential is maximized.

Keywords: Stochastic; best; response; dynamics; -; Evolutionary; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01-13
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