Is limit pricing evolutionarily stable?
Ugur Soytas and
Klaus Becker
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2003, vol. 13, issue 3, 288 pages
Abstract:
We have analyzed the question whether or not limit-pricing behavior can be viewed as a strategy, which survives the replicator dynamics in a game in which firms change strategies through imitation. Our results show that, regardless of the proportion of low cost incumbents in the population, potential entrants that play the strategy "enter" when they observe limit output are wiped out. The unique ESS consists of all low cost incumbents playing the "limit output" strategy, and all high cost incumbents playing the "monopoly output". This ESS includes potential entrants playing "stay out" after observing the limit output, and playing "enter" if monopoly output is observed in the first stage. Hence, limit pricing survives the replicator dynamics and appears in the stable state of the population. Copyright Springer Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003
Keywords: Limit pricing; ESS; Replicator dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00191-003-0154-z (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joevec:v:13:y:2003:i:3:p:281-288
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/191/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s00191-003-0154-z
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Evolutionary Economics is currently edited by Uwe Cantner, Elias Dinopoulos, Horst Hanusch and Luigi Orsenigo
More articles in Journal of Evolutionary Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().