Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules

Russell Golman () and Scott Page ()

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2010, vol. 20, issue 1, 49-72

Keywords: Adjustment dynamics; Attainability; Basins of attraction; Best response dynamics; Coordination game; Equilibrium selection; Evolutionary game; Learning; Replicator dynamics; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-009-0136-x

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