Freedom, enforcement, and the social dilemma of strong altruism

Hannelore De Silva (), Christoph Hauert, Arne Traulsen and Karl Sigmund

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2010, vol. 20, issue 2, 203-217

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; Public goods games; Cooperation; Costly punishment; Social dilemma; Strong altruism; Voluntary interactions; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-009-0162-8

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