Diversity and the disinterest in trade liberalization: on the prospects of self-enforcing cooperation

Barbara Dluhosch () and Stefanie Krause

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2013, vol. 23, issue 2, 455-475

Abstract: International economic order, including the rules of the game for trade, usually suffers from enforcement problems. We examine the prospects of self-enforcing cooperation as trade relationships evolve. It turns out that factor differentials and specificities are of utmost importance. In fact, prospects of self-enforcing cooperation are the lower the more diverse the countries are on that score. Differences may even result in countries showing an outright disinterest in trade liberalization. Notably, this result also holds in a recurrent, that is, in an evolutionary setting that otherwise induces cooperation in trade liberalization with self-enforcing properties. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Trade liberalization; Protectionism; Retaliation; Evolution; Cooperation; F13; F50; O19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-012-0267-3

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