Doubts and equilibria

Antonio Cabrales and José Uriarte ()

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2013, vol. 23, issue 4, 783-810

Abstract: In real life strategic interactions decision-makers are likely to entertain doubts about the degree of optimality of their play. To capture this feature of real choice-making, we present a model based on the doubts felt by an agent about how well is playing a game. The doubts are coupled with (and mutually reinforced by) imperfect discrimination capacity, which we model by means of similarity relations. These cognitive features, together with an adaptive learning process guiding agents’ choice behavior leads to doubt-based selection dynamic systems. We introduce the concept of Mixed Strategy Doubt Equilibrium and study its relationship with the Nash equilibrium concept. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Adaptive behavior; Doubts; Similarities relations; C72; D70; D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Doubts and equilibria (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joevec:v:23:y:2013:i:4:p:783-810

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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-012-0269-1

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