Intensity of R&D competition and the generation of innovations in heterogeneous setting

Anton Bondarev ()

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2016, vol. 26, issue 3, No 7, 653 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper discusses the role of technological spillovers and technological races in dynamic strategic interactions setup. Two firms invest simultaneously into new products creation and into further development of the quality of these products. Each firm may benefit from the costless technological spillover in case of technological leadership of the other firm. At the same time they cooperate in the joint creation of new products. Three different scenarios emerge: constant technological leadership, the technological leapfrogging and symmetric outcome with or without potential spillovers. R&D is maximal for the first scenario and minimal for the symmetric play under the threat of spillover with endogenous specialization of firms’ activities in cases of constant leadership and leapfrogging. Definition of technological competition intensity as inverse to the technology gap allows to recover inverted-U relationship between those two in a multidimensional context.

Keywords: Heterogeneous innovations; Technological race; Technology spillovers; Distributed control; Differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C02 L0 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-016-0457-5

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