Elites, institutions and growth

Louis Corriveau ()
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Louis Corriveau: Université de Moncton

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2016, vol. 26, issue 5, No 1, 933-951

Abstract: Abstract I discuss the debate between North and Thomas and Clark. I argue institutions do not cause growth, but institutional change does. I expound a theoretical model where the circulation of elites entails endogenous institutional change and growth. I prove a generation taken in isolation can increase its welfare by a unilateral reduction in institutional change, in societies where groups that compete for accession to the ruling class are relatively smaller in size; and by a move to more, in societies where those groups are relatively larger. I prove the former are dynamically efficient societies; and the latter, dynamically inefficient.

Keywords: Elites; Institutions; Growth; O40; P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-016-0469-1

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