Control delegation, information and beliefs in evolutionary oligopolies

Domenico De Giovanni () and Fabio Lamantia ()
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Domenico De Giovanni: University of Calabria
Fabio Lamantia: University of Calabria

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2016, vol. 26, issue 5, No 7, 1089-1116

Abstract: Abstract In an evolutionary delegation game, we investigate the effects on market outputs of different levels of information about the way managers are compensated. When managers are informed about their opponents, the long–run configuration of the industry depends on market conditions. When managers are informed only of the current composition of the population, only profit maximizing firms survive, no matter what market condition prevails. However, if we further lower the level of information –by hiding the current composition of the industry– then we show how managers’ beliefs affect the long run equilibrium.

Keywords: Control delegation; Evolutionary games; Quantity competition; Prospect theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-016-0472-6

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