Interaction and imitation in a world of Quixotes and Sanchos

Francisco Cabo and Ana García-González
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Ana García-González: Universidad de Valladolid

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2019, vol. 29, issue 3, No 9, 1037-1057

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies a two-population evolutionary game in a new setting in between a symmetric and an asymmetric evolutionary model. It distinguishes two types of agents: Sanchos, whose payoffs are defined by a prisoner’s dilemma game, and Quixotes, whose payoffs are defined by a snowdrift game. Considering an imitative revision protocol, a revising agent is paired with someone from his own population or the other population. When matched, they observe payoffs, but not identities. Thus, agents in one population interact and imitate agents from their own population and from the other population. In this setting we prove that a unique mixed-strategy asymptotically stable fixed point of the evolutionary dynamics exists. Taking as an example the compliance with social norms, and depending on the parameters, two type of equilibrium are possible, one with full compliance among Quixotes and partial compliance among Sanchos, or another with partial compliance among Quixotes and defection among Sanchos. In the former type, Sanchos comply above their Nash equilibrium (as they imitate compliant Quixotes). In the latter type, Quixotes comply below their Nash equilibrium (as they imitate defecting Sanchos).

Keywords: Two-population evolutionary game; Heterogeneous preferences; Symmetric and asymmetric games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D01 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-019-00620-3

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