Repeated minimum-effort coordination games

Pilwon Kim () and Dongryul Lee ()
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Pilwon Kim: UNIST (Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology)
Dongryul Lee: Sungshin University

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2019, vol. 29, issue 4, No 8, 1343-1359

Abstract: Abstract We consider the repeated minimum-effort coordination game where each player follows an adaptive strategy in each period and his choice is made via the logit probability distribution. We find that there exists a stable probability distribution of the minimum effort levels (called the equilibrium of the game), and the expected value of the minimum effort levels at the equilibrium has the same comparative-statics properties as in the experimental outcomes of Van Huyck et al. (Am Econ Rev 80(1):234–248 1990): it decreases with the effort cost and the number of players. We also find that the expected value at the equilibrium responds differently to the noise parameter, contingent on the effort-cost structure. This provides us with an implication about how we could increase the coordination among the players.

Keywords: Minimum-effort coordination game; Evolutionary dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-018-0587-z

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