Socialization and Altruism

Ingemar Hansson and Charles Stuart

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1992, vol. 2, issue 4, 12 pages

Abstract: An important problem in theoretical biology is to explain how altruism can have positive selection value. We model socialization as a costly public good that raises altruism and we study evolution equations for altruistic preferences. Stable cultural (social) equilibria exist in which socialization is supplied privately and property rights exist without civil government. In equilibrium, agents are altruistic in ways not explained by traditional biological theories. The theory essentially formalizes the story in Adam Smith's "Theory of Moral Sentiments."

Date: 1992
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