Student evaluation of teaching, social influence dynamics, and teachers’ choices: An evolutionary model

Angelo Antoci, Irene Brunetti, Pierluigi Sacco and Mauro Sodini
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Irene Brunetti: INAPP, National Institute for Public Policy Analysis
Pierluigi Sacco: IULM University Milan
Mauro Sodini: University of Pisa

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2021, vol. 31, issue 1, No 12, 325-348

Abstract: Abstract The issue of Student Evaluation of Teaching has been explored by a large literature across many decades. However, the role of social influence factors in determining teachers’ responses to a given incentive and evaluation framework has been left basically unexplored. This paper makes a first attempt in this vein by considering an evolutionary game-theoretic context where teachers face a two-stage process in which their rating depends on both students’ evaluation of their course and on retrospective students’ evaluation of their teaching output in view of students’ performance in a related follow-up course. We find that both high effort (difficult course offered) and low effort (easy course offered) outcomes may emerge, leading either to a socially optimal outcome for teachers or not, according to cases. Moreover, there may be a potential conflict between the optimal outcome for students and for teachers. We also consider possible ways to generalize our model in future research.

Keywords: Student Evaluation of Teaching (SET); Teacher effort; Teacher motivation; Strategic interaction between teachers; Human capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D79 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-020-00705-4

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