The volunteer’s dilemma in finite populations

Kai Konrad and Florian Morath

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2021, vol. 31, issue 4, No 7, 1277-1290

Abstract: Abstract We study the long-run stochastic stability properties of volunteering strategies in finite populations. We allow for mixed strategies, characterized by the probability that a player may not volunteer. A pairwise comparison of evolutionary strategies shows that the strategy with a lower probability of volunteering is advantaged. However, in the long run there are also populations of volunteering types. Monomorphisms with the more volunteering types are more frequent if the populations have fewer members, and if the benefits from volunteering are larger. Such monomorphisms with volunteering cease to exist if the population becomes infinitely large. In contrast, the disadvantage of volunteering disappears if the ratio of individual benefits and costs of volunteering becomes infinitely large.

Keywords: Volunteering; Stochastic stability; Finite populations; Mixed strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D62 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Volunteer's Dilemma in Finite Populations (2020)
Working Paper: The Volunteer's Dilemma in Finite Populations (2020)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-020-00719-y

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