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Schumpeterian entrepreneurship: coveted by policymakers but impervious to top-down policymaking

Magnus Henrekson (), Anders Kärnä () and Tino Sanandaji ()
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Anders Kärnä: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
Tino Sanandaji: Stockholm School of Economics

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2022, vol. 32, issue 3, No 4, 867-890

Abstract: Abstract Differentiating various types of entrepreneurs provides clues to the puzzle of why vertical or top-down policies often fail to create Schumpeterian entrepreneurship and the ecosystems where it thrives. Schumpeterian entrepreneurship is intrinsically contrarian, whereas public policy has a bias toward incremental innovation and replication of past success. If central planners knew what the next radical innovation would be, there would be no need for Schumpeterian entrepreneurs. Schumpeterian entrepreneurs create not only companies but also institutions in the entrepreneurial support system. These ever-evolving structures are too complex to design, and central planning instead reduces the space for organic institutional innovation.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship policy; High-impact entrepreneurship; Innovation; Institutions; Schumpeterian entrepreneurship; M13; O31; P14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-022-00761-y

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