An evolutionary view of institutional complexity

Victor Zitian Chen () and John Cantwell
Additional contact information
Victor Zitian Chen: Fidelity Investments

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2022, vol. 32, issue 3, No 11, 1090 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this conceptual paper, we discuss the evolutionary root causes of institutional complexity, defined as inherently incompatible prescriptions when different sources of institutions intersect at the same space and time. We suggest that societies are not delineated by clear-cut boundaries, but dynamically evolve along multiple co-existing levels of social lineages, each of which is associated with a given replicator. Institutional complexity thus can be conceived as a mix of potentially conflicting dispositions due to replicators derived from different historically separate social lineages. Decomposing institutional complexity into its evolutionary roots, we identify two types of inherent incompatibility that define institutional complexity: the incompatibilities between co-existing levels of the same social lineage as they evolve, and the incompatibilities between social lineages at the same level as they synthesize after having been separate in history but intersect again at the same space and time. Implications are discussed for future institutional studies.

Keywords: Generalized Darwinism; Institutional Complexity; Social Evolution; Replicators; B15; B25; B52; Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00191-022-00787-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joevec:v:32:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s00191-022-00787-2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/191/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00191-022-00787-2

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Evolutionary Economics is currently edited by Uwe Cantner, Elias Dinopoulos, Horst Hanusch and Luigi Orsenigo

More articles in Journal of Evolutionary Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().