The basins of attraction in the generalized Baliga–Maskin public good model

Elvio Accinelli, Filipe Martins () and Alberto A. Pinto ()
Additional contact information
Filipe Martins: LIAAD–INESC TEC
Alberto A. Pinto: LIAAD–INESC TEC

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2022, vol. 32, issue 4, No 9, 1289-1301

Abstract: Abstract We study an evolutionary dynamics for the contributions by agents to a common/public good in a generalized version of Baliga and Maskin’s environmental protection model. The dynamical equilibria consist of three scenarios: a single agent contributing to preserve the good with its optimal contribution level, and all the other agents being free-riders: a group of agents with the same optimal contribution level contributing to preserve the good, and all the other agents being free-riders; one where no agents contribute. The dynamics of the contributions can be complex but we prove that each trajectory converges to the equilibrium associated to the single agent (or group of agents) with the highest preference for the good that are contributing since the beginning. We note that while the aggregate contribution is below the optimal contribution level of the agent with the smallest preference for the good, then the aggregate contribution is increasing and there is no free-riding. Hence, if the optimal contribution level of the agent with the smallest preference is enough to not exhaust the good too quickly and the optimal contribution level of the agent with the greatest preference is enough to preserve the good, then, in spite of the appearance of free-riding in the contributions, the good might not be exhausted.

Keywords: Common and public goods; Non-excludable goods/externalities; Free-riding problems; Evolutionary dynamics; Stability; H41; C61; C62; Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00191-021-00758-z Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joevec:v:32:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s00191-021-00758-z

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/191/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00191-021-00758-z

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Evolutionary Economics is currently edited by Uwe Cantner, Elias Dinopoulos, Horst Hanusch and Luigi Orsenigo

More articles in Journal of Evolutionary Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().