Five shades of green: Heterogeneous environmental attitudes in an evolutionary game model

Angelo Antoci, Simone Borghesi () and Giulio Galdi
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Simone Borghesi: University of Siena

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2023, vol. 33, issue 4, No 11, 1345-1363

Abstract: Abstract An environmental policy to foster virtuous behaviour does not automatically establish a social norm in a population; that is, the policy might not be socially acceptable or enforceable. Some agents feel compelled to abide by environmental social norms and embrace them, but others do not. Some might want to imitate their peers, while others might prefer not to conform and play the role of a maverick. In this model, we describe the heterogeneity of preferences by proposing a taxonomy of five possible agent types that enrich the traditional triplet presented in the literature. We then employ a random matching model to study how a social norm spreads within a population when its composition changes. Considering three relevant population compositions (scenarios), we show that what is most important for the successful diffusion of social norms is not whether, but why agents abide by it.

Keywords: Environmental externalities; Evolutionary games; Replicator dynamics; Social norms; Green behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D62 D91 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-023-00826-6

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