Can pumped-storage power stations stimulate rural revitalization? Evidence from the four-party evolutionary game

Wei Wang, Yanbin Li, Jinzhong Li and Yun Li ()
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Wei Wang: School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University
Yanbin Li: School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University
Jinzhong Li: School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University
Yun Li: School of Economics and Management, North China Electric Power University

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2024, vol. 34, issue 3, No 3, 595-645

Abstract: Abstract This paper focuses on the social, economic, and environmental benefits of village development during the construction and operation of a pumped-storage power station (PSPS) in China. This paper provides an innovative perspective on new energy development in the context of rural revitalization. A four-party evolutionary game model was established that included the central government, local governments, PSPSs, and villagers. The evolution and stabilization strategies used in the development process of the rural revitalization were analyzed. The results show the following: (1) The greater the strength or amount of fines and penalties, the lower the cost of supervision, making it more conducive to the central government's evolution towards strict supervision. (2) The greater the tax revenues, the more likely local governments are to evolve towards active implementation. (3) The greater the social benefits, the more likely PSPSs are to evolve toward active participation. (4) The greater the resettlement compensation fees, wages, and donations, the more likely villagers are to evolve toward positive cooperation. We then provide appropriate suggestions on how PSPSs contribute to rural revitalization. This paper is important for improving the investment decision plan of PSPSs for rural revitalization and promoting China’s sustainable new energy.

Keywords: Pumped-storage power station; Rural revitalization; Evolutionary game theory; Evolutionary stability strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 I38 O53 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-024-00867-5

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