Conventions, local interaction, and automata networks

Ulrich Schwalbe and Siegfried K. Berninghaus
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Ulrich Schwalbe: Department of Economics, University of Mannheim
Siegfried K. Berninghaus: Department of Economics, University of Karlsruhe

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1996, vol. 6, issue 3, 297-312

Abstract: This paper deals with the evolution of conventions in a finite population of boundedly rational players. We apply methods from the theory of automata networks to analyze the effects of different interaction structures. It is shown that the size of the reference group for each player has an important impact on the evolutionary stability of a particular convention, and that the interaction structure crucially determines the distribution of conventions in the population.

Keywords: Conventions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joevec:v:6:y:1996:i:3:p:297-312

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