Technological standards with local externalities and decentralized behaviour

John H. Miller and Robin Cowan
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John H. Miller: Department of Social and Decision Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University, Porter Hall 208, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, USA

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1998, vol. 8, issue 3, 285-296

Abstract: We model a situation in which agents must choose between two technologies that operate under local, positive network externalities. We find that decentralized behaviour can lead to the emergence of a technical standard, but can also result in a variety of other equilibria. Policy to eliminate non-standardized equilibria can be effected, but in some cases it may be very costly.

Keywords: Local complementarities; Technology choice; Standardization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D2 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-09-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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