An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

Rosemarie Nagel and Nicolaas Vriend

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1999, vol. 9, issue 1, 27-65

Abstract: We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firms in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well-specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

Keywords: Market game; Oligopoly; Adaptive behavior; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-01-29
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Working Paper: An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game (1998)
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