Evolution and sub-optimal behaviour

Ian Dobbs () and Ian Molho ()
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Ian Molho: Department of Economics, University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, UK

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1999, vol. 9, issue 2, 187-209

Abstract: The apparently sub-optimal behaviour of economic agents in games against nature can be seen as a natural outcome of evolutionary processes. This paper extends previous work on the evolutionary stability of sub-optimal adaptations by examining how stability is affected by the introduction of multiple traits and assortative mating. It is shown that increasing the number of traits tends to increase the scope for stable second best adaptations whilst assortative mating reduces it. Various economic applications are discussed.

Keywords: Suboptimal behaviour; Evolutionary stability; Sexual inheritance; Assortative mating; Population dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-05-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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